One more datapoint on the equity bubble

The latest Flow of Funds Report (link to pdf) shows that equities comprise a greater share of US household assets than at any point besides the height of the internet bubble. Of course, elevated prices alone will increase that figure, but individuals have a tendency to increase their allocations to an asset class at precisely the time that they should consider scaling back or exiting. With no significant setbacks for three years now, the mood seems to be, “come on in – the water’s fine.”

Equities as percent household assets 2014Hat tip Cyniconomics

Daylight saving is pointless

Daylight Saving Time doesn’t save energy. It just messes up the seasonal progression of diurnal rhythms, effectively giving us jetlag. The sun was rising a few minutes earlier each week, and now suddenly it rises an hour later – an insult to nature!

As a fan of the early hours, try to ignore it and tell myself it’s earlier than the clock says, but this doesn’t work when the roads are busy before sunrise. BTW, traffic accidents and heart attacks spike in the days after the change.

Top developing

An overbought market that has kept the vast majority of investors and traders in the bull camp for several weeks is to be viewed with suspicion. When prices also begin to lose their upward momentum, they almost always enter a multi-week decline of some degree. The loss of momentum can be seen in a leveling out and decline in RSI, a bottoming out of the VIX, and choppy daily and hourly price action.

All of the above shortly precede actual declines in stock indices, and when used as a group this set of indicators gives few false positives. This should be plain as day to anyone who turns off the financial TV and just looks at the evidence. There’s no sense in calling the top of a bull market, but with the exception of “buy-and-hold-for-life” investors, it’s just plain silly to accept market risk in conditions like these. Those who want to defer capital gains to 2014 might do well to add market hedges to their portfolios.

S&P 500, 1-year (yahoo):

Here are a couple of proxies for sentiment. First the VIX, which indicates complacency when below 15. In fact, the VIX has been suppressed all year, the longest such stretch without a close above 25 since the last bull market top in 2007.

1-year VIX (yahoo):

Long-term VIX (yahoo):

The NAAIM survey of manager sentiment is a relatively new indicator, but it’s freely available online and tracks the more established sentiment surveys like those from Investors’ Intelligence.

2-year chart:

As discovered by John Hussman, elevated Treasury bond prices (higher rates) are another indication of a top in equities when coinciding with stock sentiment and price action.

1-year chart (yahoo):

I want to thank John Hussman for his outstanding historical research and backtesting of innumerable datasets, from which he has distilled a set of indicators which together represents a “syndrome” of elevated market risk (“overvalued, overbought, overbullish, rising yields”). Hussman makes little or no mention of RSI, but I suspect it may bring a greater degree of timing precision, so to my 5-symptom syndrome can be stated as follows: “overvalued, overbought, overbullish, rising yields, declining momentum.”

Happy holidays!

-Michael

Bristlecone Pine trading

Hedge funds, mutual funds and active mangers underperform and overcharge, while a simple buy-and-hold strategy regularly sustains sharp losses and lengthy secular bear markets.

So what’s an investor to do? For the rare individual who can ignore the crowd and stick to a strict discipline for years, there are elegant ways to generate outsize real returns over the very long term. Both of the following methods apply to the market as a whole and would be best used with a diversified index ETF like SPY.

Method 1 (Deep Value Only):

  • Rule A: Buy when the Shiller PE is below 10.
  • Rule B: Sell when the Shiller PE is above 20.

This method is very conservative, and over the last 130 years, would have twice kept you out of the market for a dozen years at a stretch. You would also have sold in 1992 when the S&P 500 was 400 and still be waiting to get back in. Assume you save in short-term T-bills in the meantime, collecting interest (when there is interest) and building cash to eventually invest when equities are cheap. Positions can be continually built with additional savings as long as the Shiller PE stays below 10.

By virtue of avoiding the brunt of nearly ever major market decline, you would still be up big on the S&P. The only major losses would have come during the end of the 1929-1932 crash, a drawdown of about 40% (vs 90% for the market). Even this risk could be reduced by averaging into long positions over 6 months.

You may have heard of turtle trading – well, this is more like the bristlecone pine that grows for thousands of years by virtue of taking root in environments without a lot of hazards. This discipline requires extreme patience, as you must make like a German and save in cash indefinitely until the market gets very cheap.

Method 2 (Deep Value plus Price Action):

  • Rule A: Go long when the Shiller PE is below 10, OR when the S&P500 has fallen 40% from the highest level in the last 4 years.
  • Rule B: If you last bought when the Shiller PE was below 10, or if it has fallen to 10 at any point since you bought, sell when the Shiller PE is above 20.
  • Rule C: If you last bought on the 40% rule when the Shiller PE was above 10, and the PE has not subsequently declined to 10, sell when the S&P500 has gained 80% from its bear market low (even if the Shiller PE exceeds 20 before the market is up 80%).

This method combines trading plus basic value investing, and allows you to capture some additional cyclical bull markets. For example, it would have had you buy near the bottoms in 2002 and 2008 (when the Shiller PE remained above deep value levels) and sell in 2006 and 2011, respectively. These trades would have made up for missing out on the tech bubble.

Again, the only time you would have suffered large losses under this strategy would have again been the last half of the 1929-1932 bear market. The buy-in at 40% off the 1929 peak (Dow 381) would have come in 1930 at 228, but the Dow ultimately bottomed near 40 in July 1932. No other period has seen such a relentless slide with no opportunity to sell after an 80% rally. Again, averaging into a position over 6 months from the time the market crosses the threshold of 40% or PE 10 would solve this problem.

This discipline would right now have you in cash, having missed the last two years of this likely cyclical bull, waiting patiently for another 40% decline or the restoration of value, whichever comes first.

Possible Modifications

Either of these methods can be made more aggressive or conservative by increasing or decreasing the buy-in and sell thresholds. However, Shiller PEs of 10 and 20 offer margins of safety while capturing most value buying and selling opportunities, as 40% declines and 80% rallies cover the majority of most bear and bull markets, respectively.

One way to simplify these systems even further, albeit at the expense of returns and addition of volatility, would be to never sell. This accomplishes two things: avoiding capital gains tax (Buffett often says this is his preferred tax dodge) and halving the opportunities for screwing up by not following the rules. The obvious consequence of never selling is enduring deep drawdowns during bear markets. Nonetheless, by simply saving in cash instead of buying stocks when they’re expensive, long-term returns would be far better than the index. I would hate to stay long a market with a Shiller PE well over 20, let alone 40 like in 1999-2000, but half a value discipline is better than no value discipline.

Conclusion

These methods may seem off-putting, since they require long periods of inaction, during which the prospects for making money are limited to T-bill yields. So be it. This approach is the only one I know of that 99.9% of the population has any business trying, including professional money managers. On the other hand, the methods absolutely work and produce outstanding long-term returns, which is what everyone says they want.

It’s not rocket science, so why does hardly anyone approach the market like this? Human nature of course is to blame, and Wall Street makes a living by encouraging our worst impulses. Professional investment managers may be trapped in the short-term game, but there is nothing stopping other individuals from simply opting out and doing better things with their time (like earning money the old fashioned way).

Charts that are helpful (click headers for live full-size versions):

Long-term nominal dollar Dow Jones Industrials:

DJIA chart

Long-term inflation-adjusted Dow Jones Industrials:

Long-term Shiller PE:

Hedge funds: Just say no

Hedge funds are almost never a good investment. As a class, they underperform and overcharge.

Only 20% of funds beat their benchmarks in a given year, and of those, fewer than half outperform in two of the next three years. Over five years, only 1% manage to beat the market after fees. For example, from 2007 to 2012 (which included a bear market and a bull market), the average hedge fund lost over 13%, vs. a gain of over 8% for the S&P 500.

Performance fees encourage managers to take undue risks, and fees take the magic out of compounding. Over five years, raw performance of 10% per year comes out to about 50% in cumulative gains. Factor in 20% performance and 2% management fees each year, and the total return is roughly halved.

So what explains the explosion of assets under hedge fund management in the last two decades ($2 trillion vs. $100 billion 20 years ago)? My guess is psychology. Hedge funds are sexy, a seemingly exclusive product for those with money and connections. They are an aspirational purchase – like joining a private club, becoming a limited partner signifies that you’ve made it. Not only does it say you have money, but that you are connected and savvy enough to find an ace manager (or so you think). If something is hard to get into and expensive, it has to be good.

The outsize earnings of successful managers (which can dwarf Fortune 500 CEO salaries by orders of magnitude) should serve as a red flag, but instead they add to the aura around this asset class. It’s perverse, but as everything is disclosed, and the facts about hedge funds are out in the open, investors seem to be choosing glamour over money. This is the same lack of concern as when buying a yacht or plane instead of renting, or dropping big money on a night out. Insouciance is the entire point.

The decision to invest in a hedge fund may involve elements of gambler’s conceit, luxury spending, and social belonging. It’s not about the returns.

Credit to Barry Ritholtz for data on hedge fund performance from a presentation at Agora Financial’s conference in Vancouver this past July, and to Simon Lack, author of The Hedge Fund Mirage.

Chart: Secular Bear Markets Since 1900

Secular Bear Markets (red) since 1900. Source: Crestmont Research

Secular Bear Markets (red) since 1900. Source: Crestmont Research

I like this chart, but I would change one thing: the bear that started in 1929 could extend clear through to 1948 due to inflation and multiple compression.

Inflation (regular CPI) has reached double digits in the final years of each of the last secular bears. It was inflation that made the 1910s and 1970s markets into bears, since the nominal Dow was trending sideways.

Previous secular bear markets haven’t ended until PEs are compressed to near 10. Right now the S&P 500 trailing PE is near 15, with the Shiller PE over 23.

 

It’s the future. Why don’t we have a 4-hour work week?

My friend Chris sent me a link to this provocative essay by David Graeber, “On the topic of bullshit jobs.” David raises the question of why we have so many paper-pushing service jobs that produce nothing tangible, and why we seemingly revile physical jobs that have clear benefits to society.

In the year 1930, John Maynard Keynes predicted that, by century’s end, technology would have advanced sufficiently that countries like Great Britain or the United States would have achieved a 15-hour work week. There’s every reason to believe he was right. In technological terms, we are quite capable of this. And yet it didn’t happen. Instead, technology has been marshaled, if anything, to figure out ways to make us all work more. In order to achieve this, jobs have had to be created that are, effectively, pointless. Huge swathes of people, in Europe and North America in particular, spend their entire working lives performing tasks they secretly believe do not really need to be performed. The moral and spiritual damage that comes from this situation is profound. It is a scar across our collective soul. Yet virtually no one talks about it.

 

Why did Keynes’ promised utopia – still being eagerly awaited in the ‘60s – never materialise? The standard line today is that he didn’t figure in the massive increase in consumerism. Given the choice between less hours and more toys and pleasures, we’ve collectively chosen the latter. This presents a nice morality tale, but even a moment’s reflection shows it can’t really be true. Yes, we have witnessed the creation of an endless variety of new jobs and industries since the ‘20s, but very few have anything to do with the production and distribution of sushi, iPhones, or fancy sneakers.

 

So what are these new jobs, precisely? A recent report comparing employment in the US between 1910 and 2000 gives us a clear picture (and I note, one pretty much exactly echoed in the UK). Over the course of the last century, the number of workers employed as domestic servants, in industry, and in the farm sector has collapsed dramatically. At the same time, “professional, managerial, clerical, sales, and service workers” tripled, growing “from one-quarter to three-quarters of total employment.” In other words, productive jobs have, just as predicted, been largely automated away (even if you count industrial workers globally, including the toiling masses in India and China, such workers are still not nearly so large a percentage of the world population as they used to be).

I believe David uses flawed logic when he argues that consumerism is not to blame because most new jobs are not related to the production of consumer gadgets, that consumerism is not the driving force. First of all, the production happens overseas, and secondly, production is much more efficient, requiring fewer workers.

My own thoughts on why we work so much relate to the innate competition for social status, which has not diminished despite our material advancement and a leveling of differences in the standard of living between classes. The differences between the lifestyle of a first-world billionaire and hourly worker are small compared to the difference between a 17th century king and peasant. Bentley vs. Honda is not the same as carriage vs. walking. Anyone can eat meat and imported fruit every day.

From an historical perspective, you can live extremely well on under 50k/year: strong and spacious shelter w/ modern utilities, great variety of fresh food from all over the world, fast & safe transport, empirically-based medicine, recreation, free time, etc.
However, try telling that to a prospective mate. It’s this impulse to move up the social ladder, driven by sexual selection, that keeps us striving for new ways to eek out greater income. Women are generally more classist than men, since they traditionally compete with one another for men and the resources they control, rather than cooperate to generate more resources (zero-sum vs non-zero).
Since our civilization is technically advanced and has this vast physical infrastructure in place (roads, airports, mines, factories, power plants), there is relatively little incremental need for more fixed-asset production. New enterprises tend to just make use of the existing physical plant. This means providing services, often services that are related to conspicuous consumption, or in our case as financial workers, re-arranging ownership of assets and taking little slices for ourselves.
 
I don’t agree that there is a contempt for physical jobs, aside from contempt for low pay. Most physical jobs today require little skill, since the physical plant already exists – they are operators’ jobs, not builders’. Builders (masons, carpenters, engineers) actually still get paid well.