Prechter in the morning (King World News interview)

Eric King is one of the best financial interviewers out there, so he gets the best guests of anyone I know.

Listen to the MP3 here, recorded last Saturday, March 20.

Take-aways:

The last of the bears are capitulating, just as the last of the bulls turned bearish last winter. Everybody loves stocks after a 73% rally, and there is huge psychological pressure to be bullish.

The market only gives away free money for so long (unbroken strings of up days often come near the end, as in Spring 1930).

The last two times that the market made a double top (July/Oct 2007 and the 2000 top), the Nasdaq surged at the very peak, leaving the Dow and SPX behind. SPX has just barely made a new high, but it feels like it’s much higher than in January.

GDP expansion is very weak compared to the stock rally, bank lending and jobs are still trending negative.

This is not a recession that has ended. This is a depression that has had a big countertrend rally.

States are all bankrupt, because they always spend too much. Governments always go bankrupt in the end. (Interesting factoid: Nebraska’s constitution outlaws borrowing by the state, so they are in the best shape).

All of the dollar-denominated IOUs are going to be worthless in the end. The government’s backstop has delayed this, but the debt will still go bad. The central banks will not take on all the bad debt, so the governments are trying, but they will ultimately default themselves.

Hyperinflation is not an option with all this debt. Default (deflation) is inevitable. Government defaults are deflationary.

Cycles are part of the human social experience. Muni defaults haven’t happened since the 1930s, but that is only because that was the last time we were at this point of the debt cycle. Munis will end up as wallpaper — no way the states can pay them off.

Conquer the Crash was released in 2002, but the stock market rose for 5 more years and the credit bubble got even crazier before finally topping in 2007, but the extra debt is just making things worse now that we’re at the point of no return.

We have a return of confidence. AAII (American Association of Individual Investors) survey shows about 25% bears, same as October 2007 and May 2008 tops. This is not a good buying opportunity.

Every investing group (individuals, pensions, mutual funds, etc) has been overinvested for 12 years. Mutual funds are only holding 3.5% cash. They have never given up on stocks, even in March 2009, which was nothing like in the 1970s and early 1980s.

Very few people think we can end up like Japan, and keep breaking to new lows for 20 years. Everybody always has a “story,” a narrative as to why the market is going to keep going down (at bottoms) and up (at tops).  (Story today, IMO: PPT manipulation and money printing will drive stocks up forever). The story is often exactly wrong at the top and bottom.

Interest rates do not drive stocks. Lower rates are not bullish (just look at the 1930s or 2007-2008). Rates went up from 2003 – 2007 as the market rallied. People’s logic is always incorrect at the turns. Nor do earnings drive prices: stocks fell 75-80% in real terms from 1966-1982 as earnings rose.

Oil and stocks have a correlation that comes and goes – sometimes none, sometimes very positive, sometimes very negative. No predictive power.

Markets have a natural ebb and flow that arises from herding processes in a social setting. Reasoning about causation is a waste of time.

Economists jabber on about all kinds of causation, but they never offer statistics that pass muster.

Bond funds are going to slaughter the masses. The public always buys the wrong thing at the wrong time, and a wave of defaults is coming.

The dollar is likely starting a major rally (up 9% since fall, 11% vs euro). Prechter was early on that call but it still was a good one. Might be the start of a renewed wave of deflationary pressures.

The message in the new edition of Conquer the Crash remains, “get safe.” Find a safe bank, hold T-bills or treasury-only mutual funds, cash notes, and some gold and silver. No downside to safety.

Some crystal clarity on the waves

Someone asked for clarification on where I think we are in the wave structure, so naturally I broke out my kiddie drawing program:

.

Seriously, it’s hard to get precise about labeling waves at anything but larger orders of magnitude. It’s more about the feel of the market (whether it is the probing ones and twos or a rushing three or a struggling four or an exhaustive five).

Anyway, the above drawing starts at the 2007 highs (B wave top) and ends where I think we are going in 2010. Primary 1 ended in March, primary 2 may have just ended in January, and we are now in a smaller degree first wave in primary 3. Since we’re barely 3 weeks in and are only down 6-7%, it’s likely that we are still working on minor wave 1, and within that wave probably in the 1-2 area. Minor 1 of primary 1 bottomed in March 2008 with the markets down 20% and Bear Stearns going under. This doesn’t feel anything like that yet. This is more like the early probes of February-March, July-August or October-November 2007. We’re so early in, the news guys don’t even feel the need to come up with explanatory narrative yet.

Because this is primary 3 already, don’t expect the market to be as generous with shorting opportunities as in the drawn-out, rounded top of 2007. I expect minor 1 alone to do some serious damage, certainly get down under 9000 on the Dow.

The tables are turning, and panic is on the way back.

I was extremely, almost uncomfortably short for the last couple of weeks, and with the Dow down 175 a few minutes ago, I covered my stock futures shorts and bought a few contracts to hedge up my long-term puts. It’s looking very good for the shorts — dollar up across the board, bond spreads wider, and stocks and commodities down together. Classic deflation trade.

Here’s the Dow. You can see that RSI says we’re already into oversold territory on the daily bar, which indicates the power of this move. There could be a bounce here, but I think stocks are where gold was after it fell hard from $1228 last month: they can rally, but the high is in. Now the bulls will be the ones fighting the tape.

Source: Prophet.net

–

Of course, the rally taught us bears to go easy and hedge up after little sell-offs like this, but that is going to be a frustrating stragegy if we’ve turned. As with the euro since the dollar index put in its low, surprises will be to the downside. I suspect not even this initial move down is over yet, maybe just the most violent part.

Take a look at the VIX. It has just blasted off – jumping over 50% in a week, most of it in just two days! This is giving us a very, very strong signal that panic is coming back, and in fact, was never very far off:

A decade without job gains

From Chart of the Day:

–

What was that about credit being the lifeblood of the economy? Well, the 2000s saw the greatest bubble ever, and all it got us was richer bankers. Robert Prechter often says that the depression started with the bursting of the dot-com bubble and deflation of social mood from the euphoria of the late ’90s. This chart, like the Dow:Gold ratio (down to 9 today from a peak of 44), give you and idea of what he’s talking about. After all, there was no net growth last decade — it was all a sham.

Kevin Depew interviews Robert Prechter

This is from a month ago, but it is a wide-ranging discussion from a long-term point of view. Depew is a very sharp guy who saw deflation coming himself, so this is one of the best Prechter interviews I’ve seen.

–

–

“Yes, a depression is a period that’s difficult for many many people, but it’s not the apocalypse, it’s not the end of the world. It’s just a tough period that’s gonna last, you know, five to seven years and then we’ll come out the other side.”

For a speculator, “there’s no better time than a bear market — they’re fast, they’re violent, they’re great.”

Eric Sprott: new lows ahead for S&P 500

From Bloomberg:

Dec. 29 (Bloomberg) — The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index will collapse below its March lows as an expected rebound in economic growth fails to materialize, according to hedge fund manager Eric Sprott.

The Toronto-based money manager, whose Sprott Hedge Fund returned 496 percent over the past nine years while the S&P 500 lost 32 percent, said the index’s 67 percent rally since March reflects investors misinterpreting economic data. He’s predicting the gauge will fall 40 percent to below 676.53, the 12-year low reached on March 9.

“We’re in a bear market that will last 15 or 20 years, and we’ve had nine of them,” Sprott, chief executive officer of Sprott Asset Management LP, which oversees C$4.3 billion ($4.09 billion), said in an interview Dec. 18.

–

Here’s what a 20-year, deflationary bear market looks like (Nikkei 225):

Source: Yahoo! Finance

–

Sprott also still likes gold, and from his perch in Canada he picks up smaller mining and exploration stocks. Although I like gold for the long term, I do take issue with the idea expressed here:

“If you get into this thing where you’ve got to keep printing more and more and more, who knows about the price of gold?” he said. “It will be the new currency in due course.”

Japan of course tripled its money supply and debt load in the aftermath of the bubble, but the central bank’s refusal to let bad debt and bad banks go under has locked the country into deflation and the Yen has remained strong. The debt situation in the US is much worse than in Japan, so our deflation should be even stronger. Japan was also bouyed through the ’90s and ’00s by strong exports as the rest of the world continued to grow, whereas the current bust is global. I do agree that after this deflationary stage clears the way, the government and central bank are bound to destroy the currency. The same could be said for the euro, pound and all of the rest, since none have any gold backing anymore.

The issue is timing — I have been saying since before the crash that deflation would be the situation for longer than almost anyone anticipates, myself included. This is because we have a credit system, not a cash system — in our economy it is credit issuance that controls the value of the currency unit, and credit will be contracting for years to come.

Hussman sees danger ahead

Top-performing mutual fund manager John Hussman sees no value in this “overvalued, overbought and overbullish” market.

Last week, the dividend yield on the S&P 500 dropped below 2%, versus a historical average closer to double that level. While part of the reason for the paucity of yield in the current market can be explained by the 20% plunge in dividend payouts over the past year, as financial companies have cut or halted dividends to conserve cash, the fact is that current payouts are not at all out of line with their historical relationship to revenues, and even a full recovery of the past year’s dividend cuts would still leave the yield at a paltry 2.5%. The October 1987 crash occurred from a yield of 2.65%, which was, at the time, the lowest yield observed in history, matched only by the 1972 peak prior to the brutal 1973-74 bear market.

Those two periods had a few other things in common. In the weeks immediately preceding the market downturn, stocks were overbought, had advanced significantly over prior weeks, bond yields were creeping higher, and investment advisory bearishness had dropped below 19%. All of those features should be familiar, because we observed them at the 1987 and 1972 peaks, and we observe them now…

So when will we accept more risk? Easy – when the expected return from accepting risk increases, or when the expected range of outcomes becomes narrower. Presently, two things would accomplish that. One is clarity, the other is better valuation.

First, and foremost, we have to get through the next 5-6 months, which is where we will at least begin to see the extent to which “second wave” credit risks materialize. We emphatically don’t need to work through all of the economy’s problems. What we do need, however, is for the latent problems to hatch, so we can have more clarity about what we’re dealing with. I’m specifically referring to the second round of delinquencies and foreclosures tied to Alt-A and Option-ARM loans, the requirement beginning in January that banks and other financials bring “off balance sheet” entities onto their books (which, as Freddie Mac observed in a recent footnote, “could have a significant negative impact on its net worth”), and the disposition of a mountain of mortgages that have been increasingly running delinquent, but where foreclosure has been temporarily delayed.

–

Hussman’s fund doesn’t go net-short, but past times when he’s gone fully-hedged have been good opportunities to think about short selling.

The carry trade returns

Graphite here.

One development which has been making the rounds in the financial news lately is the development of a US dollar carry trade. I won’t ponder the details of the carry trade here, as I’m sure most readers are familiar with its mechanics. Shorting low-yielding assets like the dollar to fund purchases of higher-yielding ones — which is just about anything besides the dollar these days — doesn’t take a whole lot of work or talent or luck. All it really takes is a lot of that classic elixir of speculation, leverage.

Less interesting than the character traits of carry traders, though, is the spectacular and totally unforgiving fashion in which their speculations can come to grief. Throughout the bull market of the 2000s, AUD/JPY was the king of the carry trades. (Take a look, for example, at this Investopedia article touting the dazzling 83% gains from 2000 through 2007 in the pair.) With the Aussie dollar yielding nearly 600 basis points more than the Japanese yen, the cross pair was an absolute cash cow. As long as risk appetites remained robust, this trade proceeded in a virtuous cycle: its profitability attracted new JPY shorts, who drove the yen further down and made the trade still more profitable.

Then came the financial crisis, and suddenly the carry traders found themselves all leaning the wrong way in a very crowded trade, in a market with leverage as high as 200:1. The chart tells the tale:

Source: Interactive Brokers

From July 2008 to January 2009, nearly the entire 2000-2008 bull move in AUD/JPY, from a low of 56 to a high around 104, was retraced. “Puking” doesn’t begin to capture the desperation with which longs exited this trade.

Earlier this year and a couple hundred S&P points ago, I had been somewhat dubious of EWI’s forecast for the next move down in equity markets to produce a VIX print higher than what was seen during the crash of October 2008. In the 1930-1932 period, the long, steady march down to the ultimate low never really matched the drama of the Great Crash.

However, the development of a dollar carry trade in risk assets shows that complacency and yield piggery, remarkably enough, still reign supreme in the minds of investors. The lessons of 2008 have been quickly unlearned, and its sickening drops in asset prices are now written off as temporary “liquidation events” unlikely to return for an encore performance, especially with the all-powerful U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve backstopping everything with a wall of “free” cash.

If financial companies are truly protected by an unassailable wall of cash, why are they asking to borrow it from depositors at rates far above LIBOR? Here are just a few of the solicitations for cash I’ve noticed in the past few days:

Contrary to a common misconception of the Fed’s liquidity injections, money borrowed at 0% is not “free.” At some point, traders must liquidate their carry trade-financed assets to obtain the cash to repay the principal balance on that borrowing. In the meantime, those assets had better keep going up in price, or they find themselves in the position of upside-down and potentially distressed sellers. The instability of such trades, and their susceptibility to even the slightest downside shocks in prices, are obvious.

I doubt that anyone is buying stocks with 200:1 margin these days, but if carry trade dynamics are now driving global asset markets, this could presage an eventual explosion of volatility and liquidation of the sort usually only seen in the forex and futures markets.

5th Avenue blues

Hat tip Evilspeculator

They counted 48 vacant properties (I presume mostly street-front) from 59th to 14th Streets on 5th Avenue in Manhattan. I don’t have any stats to compare this to, but it is clear that times are not so good for landlords (and their banks) in NYC. I used to live on the same block as one very large storefront shown here, and I happen to know that that particular property has been vacant for over 18 months, ever since its former tenant, a nationwide retail chain, went bankrupt.

I have noticed that many of the “for rent” signs you see in Manhattan bear the name of Vornado or other such REITs. That sector is still doomed, though traders seem to have forgotten to ask, “where’s the equity?” I suspect that in most cases, an honest accounting would reveal that net of debt and marked to market, there is none at all.

The “other side” of the deflation trade

Graphite here. I remain an ardent deflationist and continue to see strong risks of a continued collapse in asset values in world real estate and equity markets. That said, one key practice in speculation, no matter how strong one’s conviction in a particular trade, is to understand the other side of that trade and how the market could move against your position.

This can sometimes present a challenge for deflationists because so much of the opposing camp is composed of die-hard Panglossian buy-and-holders betting on a V-shaped recovery, rounded out with a few gold bugs who present little or no argument other than that the Bernanke Fed will embark on a suicidal campaign of massive money printing.

Although Marc Faber has issued calls for hyperinflation before, the discussion in the video below represents a much more measured discussion of a serious alternative to the near-term bearish case for stocks and the economy:

“My sense is that — here I’m talking about the economy — that the economy, near term, can recover, and maybe the recovery will be somewhat lengthier than expected a crack-up boom, because the first stimulus package in the U.S. probably will be followed by a second one, and money printing will lead to even more money printing next year. So it can last, say, 12 to 18 months, and then we will get another set of problems ….”

Faber goes on to recommend buying financial stocks, on the expectation that the banks will continue to get free money from the government and parlay that largess into significant profits. His long-term view remains as bearish as ever, but he presents an important alternative perspective on how soon the economic calamity will arrive and what form it will take.

That said, I think Faber is wrong that the market will continue to enthusiastically take up the Fed’s offers of liquidity and use them to fuel speculation for very much longer. No one is laboring under the delusion that the garbage stocks like AIG, FNM, and FRE which have led this last leg upward are worth anything more than zero — and while from a contrarian perspective that could indicate that there is room remaining for investors to develop an even more desperate belief in a new bull market, I think it is much more likely a manifestation of the new trend toward skepticism which will come to permeate the entire market as the bear runs its course.

Whatever your perspective, it’s always fun to see Marc Faber’s characteristic chuckle at the suggestion that our wise overseers will competently steer us through the crisis.